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RELEVANT STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, § 59-2-103(1):
(1) All tangible taxable property shall
be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal
rate on the basis of its fair market value, as
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided
by law,
Utah Code Annotated, § 59-2-102(3):
As used in this chapter and title:
* * *

(3) "Fair market value" means the amount
at which property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and
both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant f a c t s , . . . . "
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 2:
(1) All tangible property in the State,
not exempt under the laws of the United
States, or under this constitution, shall be
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 3:
The Legislature shall provide by law a
uniform and equal rate of assessment and
taxcition on all tangible property in the
state, according to its value in money, and
shall prescribe by law such regulations as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of
such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her, or its tangible property. .
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

is an appeal, from a final

decision and order " -f the

Commission, dated June 28, 1.99 1, after a formal hearing,
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its improved and subdivided

lots.

Benchmark's claim, and the

Commission's ultimate determination that an absorption adjustment
Is appropriate, rests on the character ot the ow.net of the

r

*y

-and the number of parcels owned,,, not 1* he value of the separate

h- County argued that, the Jots wore developed ami mile- .
f

-i i e?

-.*- - i i , buildinq lots for exclusive, luxury home: ana

. i

^ .-•

-

*

-* determined

;:: comparable sales e] individual . , .
!

' L- ^a'-.

' ... ^ i r M r

.

* -

-

.

'.om * i.r

c

Based upon thir^ l rie: ;
Benchmark anticipated
the project, the prop* •

• nc

- -.•

L Commis- .
'P. priice .s ;i(-iter *-nar.

'

.

he rasis

'

,ommissi

f» • * hi

:a

"^

determ: r <. a • c-

r.^.-u eiqht years to fully sellout
.-••:•

os-

i 'lizinq the absorp-

tion discount,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
1989,
BTP3.018

involved in this appeal are 1987, 1988, and
K. h,
3

.

2.

The properties that are the subject matter of this appeal

are fully developed subdivision lots located in Salt Lake County,
Utah, within ci subdivision identified as "Benchmark Subdivision",
owned by Benchmark, Inc.
3.

R. 49.

Within the Benchmark Subdivision are lots that were sold

by Benchmark to individual purchasers, some of which contain homes
and others which are individually owned, but do not have homes
built upon them.
4.

R. 9-10.

During the years in question, the County Assessor valued

each of the subdivision lots using the comparable sales methodology
of valuation.
5.

R., Exhibit 6.

The expert witnesses testifying before the Commission at

the formal hearing substantially agreed upon the fair market value
of the individual lots under the comparable sales approach to
valuation.
6.

R. 009.

Benchmark's expert witness testified that an additional

discount should be given to the lots within the subdivision owned
by Benchmark, Inc. during the years in question to reflect the
period of time required for Benchmark to dispose of all of its
lots.

R. 10.
7.

The

Commission,

in

an

earlier

case

involving

the

identical subdivision and in two subsequent cases involving Upland
Industries, determined that when a single taxpayer owns multiple
BTP3.018
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lots, an absorption or bulk discount is appropriate to reflect the
period of time it will take to sell those lots within the applicable marketplace.
8.

R. 11, 40-48.

The Commission followed its previous rulings and issued

its Final Decision and Order, directing the County to adjust the
assessed value of the subject property to reflect the absorption or
bulk discount.
9.

R. 8-20.

The County seeks reversal of the Commission's Final

Decision and Order.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant takes the position that uniform

assessment of

properties within Salt Lake County requires a determination of the
fair market value of the property as of January 1 of eeich year;
fair market value being the price a willing buyer will pay to a
willing seller in a hypothetical sale. In arriving at that value,
the County asserts that the number of lots owned by the taxpayer is
irrelevant and that an absorption discount is inappropriate.

To

hold otherwise, would confer preferential treatment on developers
and place an unfair share of the tax burden on individual lot
owners.

BTP3.018
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A R G U M E N T
POINT I

THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION AND ORDER CONTRAVENES
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORMITY IN ASSESSMENT AND
TAXATION MANDATED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE
STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah Constitution provides:
(1) All tangible property in the State,
not exempt under the laws of the United
States, or under this constitution, shall be
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 3, requires:
The Legislature shall provide by law a
uniform and equal rate of assessment and
taxation on all tangible property in the
state, according to its value in money, and
shall prescribe by law such regulations as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of
such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her, or its tangible property. .
To implement this mandate, the legislature enacted Utah Code
Annotated, §§ 59-2-103(1), which provides:
(1) All tangible taxable property shall
be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal
rate* on the basis of its fair market value, as
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided
by law. [Emphasis added.]
"Fair market value", as used in U.C.A. § 59-5-103, is defined
at U.C.A. § 59-2-102(3):

BTP3.018
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(3) "Fair market value" means the amount
at which property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and
both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. . . .
The constitution

and legislative scheme of taxation and

assessment requires the County Assessor to determine the "fair
market value" of properties based upon the amount a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller, in a hypothetical sale, on January 1 of
each year.

The constitutional and legislative provisions set

parameters by which all tangible, taxable property shall be valued
for ad valorem tax purposes within the State of Utah. The goal of
this scheme is to assure, to the greatest extent possible, that all
property shall be uniformly and equally assessed.

As this Court

explained in Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 P. 615 (1897):
It is evident that the term "according to its
value in money" [Article XIII, § 3] means that
all property shall be valued, for the purposes
of assessment, as near as is reasonably practicable, at its full cash value; in other
words, that the valuation for assessment and
taxation shall be, as near as reasonably
practicable, equal to the cash price for which
the property valued would sell in the open
market, for this is doubtless the correct test
of the value of the property.
50 P. 615, at 615-616. [Emphasis added.]
This Court noted in Harmer v. State Tax Commission, 452 P.2d
876 (Utah 1969):
It would appear that the term "its value
BTP3.018
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in money" as used in the foregoing provision
[Article XIII, § 3] is synonymous with the
term "reasonable fair cash value", "cash
value", and "market value," as are generally
used in referring to property values.
While absolute equality and unifor"ity in
the assessment of property is not practicable,
a requirement of reasonable uniformity and
equality is essential. . . .
452 P.2d, at 879.
Any valuation methodology or principle applied to determine
the fair market value of property which produced unequal and
disparate treatment contravenes both the Utah Constitution and the
statutes of the State of Utah.
In the instant case, the Commission, relying on its earlier
decisions, adopted the position that an "absorption discount" be
given to the property owner by reason of the fact that the taxpayer
owns multiple parcels of property within the contested subdivision.
The expert witnesses who testified for both sides at the
formal hearing were in basic agreement about the "retail value" of
the property.

This "retail value" is synonymous with "fair market

value", as determined by a comparable sales method.

The evidence

presented at the formal hearing clearly established that the unsold
lots, all of which are owned by Benchmark, have value, as individual lots, equal to the value of lots sold to individual purchasers
within the Benchmark Subdivision.

In resolving the controversy in

favor of Benchmark, the Commission disregarded this fact and
BTP3.018
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determined that, because

lf

[t]he value of a lot sold today at a

given price is greater than the value of a lot sold years into the
future for the same price", Benchmark, as the owner of multiple
lots, was entitled to a "bulk discount".
Despite the Commission's Final Decision and Order, the fact
remains that individual taxpayers who have purchased lots in the
Benchmark

Subdivision

have

their

purposes, at the "retail value".

property

assessed,

for tax

If the Commission's decision is

affirmed, the end result would be that the lots would be valued not
on the basis of what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in
a hypothetical sale, but on the basis of who owns the property and
how many lots are owned.
To implement the Commission's ruling, the county taxing
authorities would be required to ascertain whether each taxpayer
owns one parcel of property, a few, or many and whether the taxpayer anticipates a future sale of some or all of his property,
which would entitle him to receive the benefit of an absorption
discount on the assessed value of the property. To uniformly apply
the principle adopted by the Commission in this case, county taxing
authorities would be required to ascertain, as of the assessment
date, which parcels of property were listed for sale, the asking
price, a reasonable marketing period (based upon the level of
income required to buy the property; the more expensive properties
BTP3.018
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requiring a longer marketing period), a reasonable profit to the
seller, and an appropriate discount to be applied to each property
listed for sale.
Few courts have

addressed

this

issue.

However, recent

decisions favor disallowance of the absorption discount. The court
in Supervisor of Assessments v. St. Leonard Shores Joint Venture,
486 A.2d 206, 61 Md.App. 204 (1985), decided an identical issue.
A real estate developer challenged the tax assessment, arguing that
a "bulk ownership" discount should be applied.

The court stated:

The issue we must decide herein is whether bulk ownership of a subdivided tract of
land should be considered by a tax assessor
when assessing multiple lots owned by a single
taxpayer. Appellant, the Supervisor of Assessments of Calvert County, did not consider
the bulk ownership in accordance with a directive from the State Department of Assessments
and Taxation ("SDAT"). We believe that the
SDAT directive was properly issued and thus
find bulk ownership is not a proper consideration in the assessment process.
* * *

In light of this directive, the assessment was affirmed by the Property Tax assessment Appeal Board for Calvert County. Appellee-developer next appealed to the Maryland
Tax Court, which also affirmed the assessment
finding that it represented the full cash
value of the property, as required by statute.
In a written order and recommendation, the
Hearing Examiner of the Tax Court opined:
"Petitioner's [appellee's] approach
to fair market value is a staged sell-out
over a period of years, . . . finally
BTP3.018
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reducing the end result to a net profit
figure.
This is good, sound business
practice. Unfortunately, it is not the
way the assessment process works.
To implement Petitioner's approach
to value would be to put the assessor in
the position of being a joint venturer
with the petitioner.
If all the lots
sold in one year, we have a value certain; if all lots sell over a period of
years, we have a value dependent upon the
future whims of the market place. (emphasis [sic] added.)
The procedure is clear: recording all
117 lots, prior to the date of finality, gave
them all a fair market value as of the date of
finality. That fair market value was established by the Property Tax Assessment Appeal
Board as the retail sales price of each lot,
added each to the other, for a total of
$2,635,000.
I agree with this means of achieving a
realistic market value of a hypothetical sale
as of a hypothetical date. Accordingly, I
recommend that the decision of the Property
Tax Assessment Board be affirmed.
486 A.2d, at 207-208.

(Emphasis in original.)

The court then discussed its reasons for not accepting the
bulk ownership, staged sell-out, or absorption method:
Finally, the State argues that in order
to achieve truly uniform assessments, the fact
that one person owns more than one lot should
not be considered. We agree. Such consideration would produce an inherent preference in
favor of developers, as opposed to taxpayers
who own single or scattered lots. The SDAT
directive provides for equal treatment of all
taxpayers, absent any consideration of their
total land holdings. Moreover, a particularly
BTP3.018
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troublesome aspect of the "sell-out" period
theory is the fuzzy line of demarcation between a developer and a person owning multiple
lots. Specifically, exactly where si ?ld the
line be drawn? Is the taxpayer who c .*s four
lots or ten lots treated differently than a
developer with twenty (plus) lots?
Such
differential treatment is facially unfair and
possibly unconstitutional. Additionally, as
correctly noted by the Hearing Examiner,
utilization of the "sell-out" period theory
essentially places the State in the position
of "joint-venturer" with the developer. The
value would rely "upon the future whims of the
market place."
486 A.2d, at 211-212.
Affirming the decision of the Special Court of Appeals, the
Maryland Court of Appeals, St. Leonard Shores Joint Ven. v.
Supervisor, 514 A.2d 1215 (Md. 1986), noted:
In disputing the Supervisor's assessment
of the 105 unsold lots, appellant emphasizes
that "[t]he problem . . . is that you didn't
have 105 buyers, you had twelve—seven the
first year and five the next year." Appellant's argument misses the point. Regardless
of whether a buyer for each lot actually
exists. the assessor is required to assess
each lot as if a willing buyer exists. This
is not to say that a glut on the market should
not be considered. We think, however, that
the condition of the real estate market is
adequately reflected in the price that the
hypothetical buyer would be willing to pay.
Therefore, we reject appellant's contention
relating to the "sell-out period" of the lots.
514 A.2d, at 1217.

(Emphasis added.)

In this case, the use of the absorption method relieves the
developer of a portion of the tax burden that should be borne by
BTP3.018
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the developer and it imposes additional tax burdens on other
taxpayers.

It is respectfully submitted that this different

treatment is "facially unfair", unconstitutional, and contrary to
the clear mandate of the Utah Constitution and Utah statutes.
In Charles J. and Charlott Mathias v. Department of Revenue,
State of Oregon, Oregon Tax Court, Case No. 2910 (Decision filed
April 10, 1990) (see Appendix 1), the Oregon Tax Court was called
upon to determine whether a statute which provided that:: "If the
property consists of four or more lots within one subdivision, and
the lots are held under one ownership, the lots shall be valued
under a method which recognizes the time period over which those
lots must be sold in order to realize current market prices for
those lots."

1989 Or. Laws, Chapter 796, Section 30.

The plaintiffs contended that the law was unconstitutional
because it implicitly acknowledged that current, true cash value
was greater than the value of the owners7 collective interest in
the lots.

The court, in analyzing the impact of the statute on

fair market value and the constitutional provisions of the Oregon
Constitution which mandate uniformity, determined that the statute
directly violated the basic protection afforded by the Oregon
Constitution because owners of lots of equal true cash value would
not pay taxes on equal values.

The multiple owner, given the

discount because of his ownership, would be paying taxes on a
BTP3.018
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lesser value, not because the properties were different or were
used differently, but simply because the owners were different.
Some owners owned more than four lots, some owners owned less than
four lots, some owners owned four lots.

In each case, each owner

was treated differently by virtue of his ownership even though the
value of the lots was the same. In striking the statutory scheme,
the Oregon Tax Court made the following significant statement:
It is difficult for this Court to imagine
a more discriminatory scheme.
It is difficult to conceive of a justifiable* exemption law which should select single
individuals or corporations, or single articles of property, and, taking them out of the
class to which they belong, make them the
subject of a capricious legislative favor.
[Citing 1 Taxation Section 381-382 (3rd Edition, 1903).]
In a footnote, the court observed:
The absorption period for collection of
properties is not solely a function of their
location.
The fact that the method favors
multiple ownership in the same subdivision
does not directly correlate with the time it
might take to market a number of lots owned by
one taxpayer.
The court reasoned:
The statute directs disparate taxation of
properties which are not different.
Their
physical characteristics and uses may be
virtually identical.
The court also noted that the Department of Revenue for the
State of Oregon, with its expertise in ad valorem taxation, should
BTP3.018
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have understood that such a method as attempted to be employed in
Oregon,

"runs

contrary

to

the

basic

principles

taxation", citing the following statement

of

property

in support of its

position:
It is a well accepted rule of valuation
that the individual personalities and opportunities of particular owners must be ignored.
[4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Chapter 12;
State Highway Commission v. Arnold, et al.,
340 P. 2d 1089 (Oregon 1959) and Joseph Hydro
Associates, Ltd. v. Department of Revenue, 10
OTR 277 (Oregon Tax Court 1986).
The

Oregon

Supreme

Court

has

rejected

a

absorption

or

"developer's" discount in First Interstate Bank v. Dept. of Rev.,
760 P. 2d 880 (Or. 1988).

In that case, as here, the taxpay-

er/developer sought a reduction of the fair market value by a rate
return based on expected profit, taking into consideration the
estimated time necessary to sell the lots.

Discussing this

"developer's discount", the court observed:
Reduction by this method results in a
determination of the properties7 value to the
current owner or their value as an investment.
This is not the market value, which is the
price that each property would receive on the
open market.
[Citation omitted.] While in
certain circumstances the value to the owner
might equal the market value, the value to the
owner cannot be equated with market value.
There is no dispute that the highest and
best use of each lot is for the construction
of a single-family residence. Only by valuing
the property at its highest and best use can
the true cash value of a property be deterBTP3.018
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mined. [Citation omitted-] The developer's
discount does not assess the value of the
properties if put to their highest and best
use, but reduces their value to arrive at the
value of the properties considered as an
investment. Investment is not the highest and
best use of the properties.
We agree with the Tax Court that the
developer's discount is not a permissible
method of valuation in the present case. . . .
760 P.2d, at 883.
As was correctly observed by the Oregon Court, and is true
with the scheme of property taxation employed in the State of Utah,
the number of ownership interests and how they are arranged is
immaterial to a property tax system that addresses the value of
land for property tax purposes. In its final conclusion, the court
determined that the statute that classified taxpayers based upon
multiple ownership of lots resulted in a violation of the uniformity provisions of the Oregon Constitution because it reduced the tax
burden on those persons who owned multiple lots, even though the
lots were substantially similar to those persons owning four or
fewer lots.
The reasoning of the Oregon Tax Court is equally applicable in
this case. The discount requested by Benchmark is requested after
the fair market value of the property has been determined by using
the comparable sales method. Indeed, Benchmark's own exhibit shows
that, in employing the comparable sales method, there is less than
BTP3.018
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5% difference, plus or minus, between the appraisal made by the
expert witness for Benchmark, and the County's expert witness.
In Glen Point Associates v. Township of Teaneck, 10 N.J. Tax
506 (Tax Court of N.J. 1989), the taxpayer appealed the value of
his property as established by the assessor for the township of
Teaneck.

The property owner's expert, in addition to other

challenges, employed an income approach that included an absorption
period discount for an estimated rent-up period to a structurally
completed office building, when there was another office building
in the same municipality that was comparable in all important
respects, but was valued without a discount because it was fully
rented.

The court, rejecting this discount for a holding or rent-

up period

(similar to a sell-out period), made the following

observations:
. . . The court concludes, therefore, that the
expert's absorption-period discount is contrary to the New Jersey Constitution, Art.
VIII, § 1, par. 1(a), which requires that all
property be assessed in accordance with uniform rules and the same standard value. The
absorption-period discount for an office
building is conceptually indistinguishable
from the marketing discount rejected by this
court on identical constitutional ground in
Glen Point Associates v. Teaneck Tp., 10 N.J.
Tax 288 (Tax Ct. 1988) (sale of townhouse
condominium units) and Tall Timbers, Inc. v.
Vernon Tp. . 5 N.J. Tax 299 (Tax Ct. 1983)
(sale of campsite condominium units).

BTP3.018
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The technique is unsound. The property
is to be ^alued as though sold on the assessing datt
not according to its value on a
subseque. c date, discounted for time. [Citation omitted.] A purchaser is deemed to t ve
made his decision as to the price he is wi „ing to pay, and the seller is deemed to have
made his decision on the price he is willing
to accept, on the basis of facts and circumstances known or reasonably foreseeable on the
assessing date. [Citations omitted.]
10 N.J. Tax, at 517.
The

absorption

rate

discount

granted

to

Benchmark, and

seemingly estciblished for all taxpayers owning multiple parcels of
property held for sale, is inconsistent with the Utah Constitution
and statutes which require property to be valued for assessment
purposes at its full cash value, as of the date of assessment.
Application of the discount relies on the character of ownership as
opposed to the character of the property. Neither the Constitution
nor the statutes of this State contemplate that the land holdings
of a taxpayer will affect the value of his properties for assessment purposes.
POINT II
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ADOPTING APPRAISAL METHODS
USED BY INSTITUTIONAL LENDERS IN VALUING
REAL PROPERTY FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES
In the context of equality and uniformity, an absorption
discount might be supportable when dealing with valuation of
proposed subdivision which are not complete or in a case where no
BTP3.018
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lots have been sold. However, the application of an absorption or
bulk discount to the subject property, where numerous parcels
within the subdivision have been sold and appraised by the County
for tax purposes at the fair market value, based on the comparable
sales method,

constitutes

a violation

of

the principles

of

uniformity.
It is evident from Exhibit 8 (R. 74-78) that the value which
Benchmark places on its property requires the developer's lots
receive a substantial discount in their taxable value from the
value established by the County on lots within the same subdivision
which have been sold to individual lot owners.

The Commission

adopted this discount, despite the fact that Benchmark's own expert
witness and the County's expert witness agreed the lots were
comparable in all respects and carried the same "retail value".
This asserted difference in value is not the result of any
difference in what a willing buyer would pay for each lot to a
willing seller in a hypothetical sale as of the assessment date.
The difference

is the result of utilizing

totally different

methodologies to value the comparable properties, based upon the
ownership of the properties.
In arriving at its decision, the Commission gave great weight
to federal regulations governing the appraisal of properties in the
context of obtaining financing. Benchmark's expert relied upon and
BTP3.018
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testified extensively concerning a memorandum, R 41c (R. 51),
issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Office of Examinations
and Supervision. The memorandum deals with appraisal policies and
practices of insured institutions and service corporations and
establishes guidelines for appraisals of properties in the context
of applying for and obtaining financing and seeks to implement
standards to ensure that appraisals "properly reflect the collateral lending posture of the institution, as well as its lending
policies." (R„ 52, lines 19-21.)

The memorandum is designed to

ensure that appraisals of property will be prepared so as to
reflect the present value estimates of the property over the life
of the credit arrangement.
Lenders are concerned with recovering their carrying costs,
providing reserves for repossession costs, and considering resale
costs. In view of recent failures of financial institutions, it is
not surprising that more conservative policies have been adopted to
prevent excessive loans being made on properties which will not be
sold, in bulk, but rather liquidated over a substantial period of
time.

It is common knowledge that lenders do not lend 100% of the

fair market value of a property. Rather, they lend on a discounted
value such as that adopted by the Commission. This loan value will
theoretically provide the lender with protection of its collateral
in the event the lender is required to repossess and resell the
BTP3.018
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property.
It is clear, then, that the Commission adopted a valuation
method based upon the amount a willing lender will lend to a
willing borrower to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that
the loan will be timely repaid.

The documentary evidence and

testimony presented by Benchmark at the formal hearing concerning
the use of entrepreneurial profit, carrying costs, and other
factors to be considered in arriving at an absorption discount
would be relevant only if the Commission were sitting to determine
if the County had properly valued the property for purposes of
obtaining a loan from a federally insured institution.

Imposing

these governmental regulations on county taxing authorities totally
disregards the concept of fair market value; the concept of a
willing buyer and a willing seller. Utilization of two completely
different valuation methods to assess identical properties for tax
purposes is manifestly unjust and results in a de facto amendment
of the Utah statute defining fair market value.

CONCLUSION
The property which is the subject matter of this litigation is
part of a platted subdivision in Salt Lake County. Benchmark seeks
a tax advantage, via an absorption discount, over taxpayers owning
identical properties.
BTP3.018
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owned by Benchmark and other lot owners within the Benchmark
Subdivision is that Benchmark owns multiple lots. Neither the Utah
Constitution, Utah statutes, nor any prior decisions of this court
contemplate that the number of parcels owned by a particular
taxpayer should be considered in determining the fair market value
of each parcel for tax assessment purposes.
The Commission

erred

in considering

the regulations and

policies of federally insured lending institutions dispositive of
the appropriate valuation method.

The result of the Commission's

decision is a unequal and unfair benefit in favor of developers and
the imposition of an unfair share of the tax burden upon individual
lot owners.

This result is prohibited by the Constitution of the

State of Utah.

For these reasons, the decision of the Commission

should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ b '— day of October, 1991.

DAVID YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
BILL THOMAS PETERS
Deputy County Atts

-#ILL THdMAS PETERS
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APPENDIX 1

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
lq

Property Tax

* ** io m s 33

No. 2910
CHARLES J. and CHARLOTTE
MATHIAS,
Plaintiffs,
v.

)
)
)
)

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
State of Oregon,
Defendant.

)
)
)
ORDER

Plaintiffs own a lot in a subdivision in
West Salem.

Comparable lots in the same subdivision are

assessed at values lower than plaintiffs1 because of their
ownership.

Defendant has approved this unequal treatment

because the 1989 legislature enacted ORS 308.205(3).

That

statute provides:
"If the property consists of four or more lots
within one subdivision, and the lots are held under
one ownership, the lots shall be valued under a
method which recognizes the time period over which
those lots must be sold in order to realize current
market prices for those lots." 1989 Or Laws
ch 796, § 30.
Plaintiffs contend that this law is
unconstitutional.

ORDER

Inasmuch as there is no dispute as to the
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facts, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.1
BACKGROUND
The "dominate note" of Oregon's property tax system
is that property is to be valued at its market value*
Portland Canning Co, v. Tax Com.. 241 Or 109, 404 P2d 236
(1965).

Before 1987, defendant mistakenly advised the county

assessors to apply a "developer's discount" to lots which
collectively would take more than one year to sell.

This

resulted in developer-owned lots being assessed at less than
true cash value while individually owned lots were assessed
at full true cash value.
In First Interstate Bank v. Dept. of Rev., 10 OTR
452 (1987), af f'd 306 Or 450, 760 P2d 880 (1988), this court
condemned that practice because it values the owner's
interest in the property.

Property tax is imposed on the

value of the property, not the value of the owner's interest.
Sproul et al y_^ Gilbert et al, 226 Or 392, 421, 359 P2d 543
(1961).

This court found there is no basis for valuing a

$14,000 lot at $9,000 simply because the owner owns many
such lots.
1

If such a valuation principle were accepted, the

1989 Or Laws ch 796, § 32 provides:

"The Department of Revenue and the Oregon Tax
Court shall apply the amendments to ORS 308.205 by
section 30 of this Act in any appeal pending on
March 31, 1989. "
Plaintiffs1 appeal, commenced in 1988, was pending before the
Department of Revenue on March 31, 1989.
ORDER
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largest timber owners, landlords and industries could
likewise lay claim to a discount.

The court also found that

the developer1s discount method violated Oregon's
constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation.2
After the Supreme Court1s decision, a bill was
introduced in the 198 9 legislature to make the method law.
With only minor changes, and with the support of the
Department of Revenue, the provision was enacted as
1989 Or Laws ch 796, § 30.
LAW PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL
Once again this court must consider the validity of
the "developer's discount1' method.

However, in this instance

it is ''presumed to be constitutional and every intendment
must be indulged by the court in favor of its validity."
Tompkins v. District Boundary Board, 180 Or 339, 350,
177 P2d 416 (1947).

Further, if plaintiffs are to prevail

they must show that the statute is unconstitutional "beyond a
reasonable doubt."
"It is also a canon of statutory construction
that if a legislative enactment can be given any
reasonable construction consistent with its
validity, such interpretation should be adopted."
Wright v. Blue Mt. Hospital Dist., 214 Or 141,
144, 328 P2d 314 (1958).
Finally:
"After the process of construction has been
accomplished, the decisions still admonish that we
should indulge every presumption in favor of
2

The constitutional issue was not reached by the
Supreme Court in affirming this court's decision.
ORDER
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validity and declare no act of the legislature void
unless invalidity be shown beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v^ Anthony, 179 Or 282, 301, 169 P2d
587 (1946).
gee also City of Portland v^ Goodwin, 187 Or 409, 416, 210
P2d 577 (1949).
Two provisions of Oregon1s constitution directly
bear on the issue.

The relevant portion of Article I,

section 32, requires that:
11

[A] 11 taxation shall be uniform on the same class
of subjects within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax.11
In a similar vein, Article IX, section 1, provides:
"The Legislative Assembly shall, and the
people through the initiative may, provide by law
uniform rules of assessment and taxation. All
taxes shall be levied and collected under general
laws operating uniformly throughout the State.ff
In commenting upon the effect of these two
provisions, the Oregon Supreme Court has stated:
,!

These provisions were intended to permit the
reasonable classification of subjects of taxation
* * *. The legislature has wide discretion in
classifying subjects of taxation." Knight v. Dept.
of Revenue, 293 Or 267, 271, 646 P2d 1343 (1982).
CONSTRUING THE STATUTE

The apparent purpose of the statute is to benefit
those taxpayers who own more than four lots in one
subdivision by treating the lots as a collective whole.

By

assuming that sale of the lots will take place over time, the
greater the number of lots held under one ownership, the
greater the discount.
ORDER

While this may seem patently unfair to
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taxpayers who own fewer than four lots, the classification
roust be sustained if there is any rational basis for it.
"What is required in assessing a constitutional
challenge to classification for tax benefit is a
review of the grounds for the classification to
determine if it rests upon a rational basis. The
legislature may make distinctions of degree having
a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial
scrutiny they roust be presumed to rest on that
basis if there is any conceivable state of facts
which would support it. Carmichael v. Southern
Coal Co., 301 US 495, 57 S Ct 868, 81 L Ed 1245,
109 ALR 1327 (1937) ; Smith et al v^ Columbia County
et al, 216 Or 662, 341 P2d 540 (1959). It,
however, is not sufficient to merely point out
differences between the groups of taxpayers for
divergent treatment. The differences justifying
the attempted classification must bear a reasonable
relationship to the legislative purpose. The
legislative power to create a classification
implies the authority to subclassify persons
included in the general class if there is a
rational basis for making this further distinction.
Smith et al \ L Columbia County et al, supra; State
v. Kozer, 116 Or 581, 242 P 621 (1926)." Huckaba
v. Johnson, 281 Or 23, 26, 573 P2d 305 (1978).
In examining the statute, it is difficult to find
any rational basis for the distinctions.

The "lots" involved

are not limited to newly developed or even vacant lots.
are also not restricted in use or size.

They

A national

corporation could own ten lots of one acre each in an
industrial subdivision improved with a large manufacturing
plant.

The corporation would be entitled to a reduced value

for those lots.

Despite the apparent purpose of the law,

ownership is not limited to developers, financial
institutions or any other particular type of owner.
By discounting the value of the lots over time,
the statute assumes that the lots are for sale.
ORDER

Strangely,
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it does not require the lots to be held for sale.

Also,

"current market prices" can only mean the current market
value or true cash value.

Thus, the statute implicitly

acknowledges that current true cash value is greater than the
value of the owner's collective interest in those lots.

In

essence, the statute is directing valuation based on
ownership interests rather than the property's actual value.
This presents significant uniformity problems.

Two examples

will illustrate those problems.
Example 1
Assume a subdivision of 300 lots, all of which are
very similar and have the same "current market price." A
taxpayer who owns 150 lots in the subdivision will be
assessed less value per lot than a taxpayer owning 15 lots.
Likewise, a taxpayer owning 15 lots will be assessed at a
lesser value per lot than a taxpayer owning five lots.

Only

those taxpayers owning less than four lots will receive no
reduction from true cash value.
Example 2
A taxpayer might be a landlord who owns 20 rental
houses in the same subdivision.

The 20 lots would be reduced

in value as if they were for sale even though they are not.
Another landlord may own 20 similar rental houses located in

ORDER
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several subdivisions.

That landlord will receive no reduced

land value even though all 20 properties are for sale.3
KQ RATIONAL BASIS
This court cannot find any rational basis for the
distinctions made.

Defendant contends that the statute was

perhaps enacted to encourage subdivision development.
However, the statute is not limited to developers nor to
property being developed.
development.

The statute does not encourage

It only encourages multiple lot ownership in

the same subdivision.
The court finds that the statute directly violates
the basic protection afforded by Article I, section 32 of the
Oregon Constitution.

Property of the same class, i.e., lots

in subdivisions, are not subject to uniform taxation.

Owners

of lots of equal true cash value would not pay taxes on equal
values.

This is not because the properties are different or

are used differently but simply because the owners are
different.

It is difficult for this court to imagine a more

discriminatory scheme.
"It is difficult to conceive of a justifiable
exemption law which should select single
individuals or corporations, or single articles of
property, and, taking them out of the class to
which they belong, make them the subject of
capricious legislative favor." 1 Cooley, Taxation
381-382 (3rd ed 1903).
3

The absorption period for a collection of properties
is not solely a function of their location. The fact that
the method favors multiple ownership in the same subdivision
does not directly correlate with the time it might take to
market a number of lots owned by one taxpayer.
ORDER

Page 7.

The statute directs disparate taxation of
properties which are not different.

Their physical

characteristics and uses may be virtually identical.
fact, even the owners may be identical,

In

A taxpayer may own

four lots in one subdivision, the values of which are
reduced, and three lots in another subdivision, the values of
which are not reduced.

The statute fails to describe the

class for special treatment by any characteristics having a
rational basis for the difference.

There can be little doubt

that if the statute attempted to impose a higher value for
taxation, the classification would be declared
unconstitutional.
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AD VALOREM TAXATION
It is difficult for this court to understand how
the department could encourage the legislature to enact such
a provision.

Surely the department, with its expertise in

ad valorem taxation, should understand that such a method
runs contrary to the basic principles of property taxation.
fl

It is a well-accepted rule of valuation that the
individual personalities and opportunities of
particular owners must be ignored. 4 Nichols on
Emminent Domain ch 12; State Highway Com, v.
Arnold et al, 218 Or 43r 341 P2d 1089, 343 P2d 1113
(1959)." Joseph Hydro Associates, Ltd. v. Dept. of
Rev. . 10 OTR 277, 283 (1986) [owner's income tax
consequences on hypothetical sale of property
ignored].
The number of ownership interests and how they are
arranged are ignored in our property tax system.

ORDER
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"In fixing the true cash value of land for
property tax purposes the effect of existing leases
on the value to the owner is disregarded. The
basis for such a principle is that the tax is
levied upon the land and is a tax upon all the
interests into which the land might be divided,ff
Swan Lake Mldg. Co, y^ Dept. of Rev,. 257 Or 622,
625, 478 P2d 393, 480 P2d 713 (1971).
Only where partial interests become part of the
public domain by easement, restrictions or other conveyance
are such interests recognized.

See for example Willamette*

Factors y^ Dept. of Rev.. 8 OTR 400 (1980); Rockwood
Development Corp. y^ Dept. of Rev.f 10 OTR 95 (1985);
Tualatin Development v. Dept. of Rev. , 256 Or 323, 473 P2d
660 (1970), and Narchel v. Dept. of Rev. . 9 OTR 317 (1983).
The statute tries to account for the time the
property may have to be on the market before it sells.
However, defendant's own administrative rule defining "Market
Value11 recognizes that every property requires some time to
be exposed on the market.
"Market Value as a basis for true cash value
shall be taken to mean the most probable price in
terms of money which a property will bring if
exposed for sale in the open market, allowing a
period of time and financing typical for the
particular type of property involved and under
conditions where both parties to the transaction
are under no undue compulsion to sell or buy and
are able, willing and reasonably well-informed."
OAR 150-308.205(A)(1)(a). (Emphasis added.)
As pointed out above, the legislature has wide
discretion in making classifications.

It may tax property

unequally just as it may exempt some property entirely.

ORDER
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doing so, however, there must be some rational basis for the
classifications it makes.
"This does not mean that the subjects of the
class selected for taxation shall be precisely
alike in all respects, but rather that they must be
alike in the essential particulars which induced
the legislature to include them in one
classification. All within the class must be
susceptible of like treatment and all the
constituents of the class must be affected alike
under like circumstances.11 Standard Lbr. Co. v.
Pierce et al^, 112 Or 314, 336, 228 P 812 (1924).
CONCLUSION
In this case, the legislature has selected for
classification taxpayers owning more than four lots in one
subdivision.

The court is unable to discern any essential

similarities in the subjects of the classification made.

It

discriminates against those owning fewer than four lots in
one subdivision by reducing the tax burden of those who own
more than four lots.

If the uniformity provisions mean

anything, they must prohibit this type of discrimination.
Now, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment be, and hereby is, denied; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs1 Motion For
Summary Judgment be, and hereby is, granted.
Plaintiffs to recover their costs and
disbursements.
Dated this

/Q&

day of April 1990.

JUDGE
ORDER
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